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1Degree-based Clustering Algorithms for Wireless
Ad Hoc Networks Under Attack
C. Tselikis, S. Mitropoulos, N. Komninos, Member, IEEE C. Douligeris, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we investigate the behavior of degree-
based clustering algorithms with respect to their stability and
attack-resistance. Our attack scenario tries to bias the clustering
head selection procedure by sending faulty degree claims. We pro-
pose a randomized variant of the highest degree algorithm which
is proved, through experimental results, attack-resistant without
imposing significant overhead to the clustering performance. In
addition, we extend our proposal with a cooperative consistent
clustering algorithm which integrates security into the clustering
decision achieving attacker identification and classification.
Index Terms—secure clustering, cooperation, simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
Elf-organization in hierarchical structures with multi-level
clustering is appealing in large scale ad hoc networks,
MANET and Wireless Sensor Networks. However, two clus-
tering issues remain challenging in dynamic mobile environ-
ments: a) how to minimize the re-clustering overhead in the
face of network partitions (link or node outages), and b)
how to make the clustering procedure attack-resistant without
sacrificing clustering and network performance. Regarding (a)
many heuristic solutions can be found in the literature [1]
which when sub-network merging or split is detected they
select new cluster heads (CH). Regarding(b) in [2] a cluster-
based cooperative IDS is proposed in which only the fairly
and securely selected CHs perform traffic monitoring and
intrusion detection. We address (a) by proposing a cooperative
weighted clustering scheme, the Consistent Clustering Algo-
rithm (CCA), and we address (b) in two different ways, namely
by proposing a randomized version of the highest degree
algorithm (RHD) and by integrating into CCA a cooperative
mechanism in which any node can act as a detector that
correlates the advertized node claims in order to identify the
attackers. We concentrate on the protection of the weighted
clustering schemes because their merits are numerous, namely
they are application-independent, by weight-optimization can
be adaptable to different network conditions (e.g., topology
changes due to mobility), they are applicable to both central-
ized and distributed architectures and allow for simultaneous
self-organization and self-protection when extended with secu-
rity components. One disadvantage is that they can introduce
significant communications overhead and processing delay
(unless the clustering information is exchanged only locally).
Our experimental results show that when the CH selection
procedure is protected, additional re-clustering overhead is
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imposed. Particularly, the proposed CCA selected as CH one
of the simulated attackers with the least probability but, on
average, the CCA CH change rate was found approximately
three times more than that of the HD. On the other hand, the
proposed randomized CH selection (RHD) can offer protection
in the sparse network case with small processing and re-
clustering overhead.
Section II presents our conceptual model and the compared
clustering algorithms. Next, in section III we present our
assumptions, the integrated simulation model and the experi-
mental results. Section IV draws the conclusions.
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Our conceptual model is based on the ad hoc self-
organization concept, as shown in Figure 1. This model
demands global agreement (consensus) to be reached for
cluster formation and for intruder identification. Also the ad
hoc routes are selected after a mutual exchange of opinions
amongst the neighboring nodes.
Fig. 1. Conceptual model for self-protection and self-organization
Figure 1 shows two complementary defense blocks, namely
the cryptographic (encryption, authentication with digital sig-
natures and key management) and the cooperative block
(includes intrusion detection with consensus, reputation/trust,
voting and game-based schemes). We concentrate here on
the cooperative secure clustering since we want to evaluate
the efficiency of such mechanisms (especially consistency
thresholds) as substitutes for cryptographic primitives. In that
respect, we propose a randomized variant of the highest degree
and we extend our proposal with the cooperative CCA. Also,
we investigate how the HD and its variant WHD behave under
2attack. The CH selection criteria for each algorithm follow.
Highest Degree (HD) HD is a well-known from the 90s ad
hoc clustering algorithm in which as local CH is selected the
node with the maximum connectivity degree, i.e., the node
with the maximum number of uncovered in-range neighbors
(periodic broadcast messages are used for one-hop neighbor
detection).
A. Weighted Highest Degree (WHD)
WHD [4] is a variant of the HD algorithm in which the
clustering score Vi for each node i is calculated as the inverse
of the sum of the degrees of his j neighbors, Equation (1).
WHD gives high priority to low-degree nodes with many
neighbors aiming to reduce the number of clusters.
Vi =
1∑N
j=1 degj
(1)
B. Randomized Highest Degree (RHD)
RHD is part of our proposal in which the top−k neighbors,
i.e., the nodes having the k largest advertised degrees are found
and the new local CH is drawn randomly (by the old CH)
amongst the top − k neighbors. In our tests with RHD we
used the uniform random number generator however we rec-
ommend the use of parameterized pseudo-random generators
for increased guarantees of security.
C. Consistent Clustering Algorithm (CCA)
CCA extends our proposal. CCA for each node i takes
into account its degree degi (the number of nodes whose
Euclidean distance from i is less than the radio range of i),
an energy-related fairness factor Fi (how many times i has
previously served as CH), a security-related component and
the nodes Euclidean distance Li from the clusters maximum
range (nodes located at the neighborhoods center are more
preferable). Equation (2) presents the normalized clustering
variable Vi of CCA:
Vi = a×
degi
dmax
+b×
Fi
Fmax
+ct×
(
Nf
degi
−
2
3
)
+d×
Li
Lmax
(2)
where the coefficients a, b, ct and d satisfy the following:
a+ b+ ct + d = 1. (3)
The third component in Equation (2) protects the CH
selection from nodes that advertise faulty degrees in order to
gain the CH role and hence control the network. CCA classifies
each node as normal, suspect or attacker and allocates a
different value of ct for each type of node according to
Equation (4). According to CCA, the maximum acceptable
advertised degree degi equals to the network size which is
assumed known. If this threshold is exceeded, the monitored i
is marked as attacker and it is immediately excluded from both
the clustering and the routing procedures (red alarm raised).
ct =


> 0 if
Nf
degi
> 2
3
, 0.4 for dense, 0.2 for sparse,
< 0 if
Nf
degi
<= 2
3
,
= 0 if degi > network size, (a, b, d = 0).
(4)
TABLE I
CONSISTENT CLUSTERING ALGORITHM (CCA)
For each ad hoc node
Phase I: node set-up
place the node in the field according to the topology model;
initiate the node state and the clustering / network elements;
Phase II: CH selection
start moving the nodes randomly;
build nodes Neighbour-List (NL);
if (NL.size ¿ max-cluster-size) then
truncate NL to max-cluster-size;
sort NL on the Vi (the neighbors scores)
for each node i in NL
if (Nf / degi 2/3) then
neighbor is suspect, calculate Vi with c ¡ 0; from Eq. (2)
else if (Nf / degi ¿ 2/3) then
node is normal, calculate Vi with c ¿ 0; from Eq. (2)
else if (degi ¿ network-size) then
node is attacker, exclude node from decision;
CH = neighbor with maximum Vi;
Phase III: re-clustering
if new selected CH was simple member before then
Increase the number of CH changes;
Update the CH states; Update the members state; Update the CH-Table;
Further, CCA detects those nodes that send unreasonably
high claims by evaluating the ratio of the number Nf of the
neighbors found to contain i in their Neighbor Lists over the
degree degi advertized by i (log2n binary search processing
delay). When the ratio of the search result (Nf ) over degi is
less or equal than the second threshold (set to 2/3 according to
the byzantine agreement requirement [4]) node i is classified
as suspect (yellow alarm). According to CCA, a suspect is not
immediately excluded but he is penalized by reducing his Vi.
CCA consists of three phases, namely the set-up phase, the
CH selection and the re-clustering phase. Table I presents the
pseudo-code of the proposed CCA.
In Phase I the network state is initialized and during Phase II
the nodes select the CHs. If the previous state of a new selected
CH was simple member, re-clustering is performed (Phase III)
i.e., the CH changes are increased, and the node states and the
clustering tables are updated. In addition, the neighbors have
to associate with the new announced CH by sending him a
join message and the new CH has to acknowledge each one of
them. The three-phase clustering structure is also followed by
the compared RHD, HD and WHD however in the respective
implementations each algorithm makes decisions according to
its own CH selection criteria (as described previously).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We simulated nodes moving randomly according to the
Random Waypoint model and broadcasting their degree (true
or not), their NL (true or not) and their coordinates (only true,
known via GPS or other localization means). Any node can be
a CH (peers). The clustering procedure yields two-hop clusters
and two types of nodes: a) simple nodes (e.g., tiny sensors)
which perform nothing more than default routing to their
CH, and b) CHs which aggregate, filter, secure and route the
received messages to the final destination via the other CHs.
No two selected CHs must be in range. Every node is covered
3by a CH. There is a maximum on the cluster membership (25
nodes). We assume the clustering of L legitimate nodes (L=95)
is threatened by two types of N in total attackers (N=5): a) by
class A attackers who advertise a degree which is larger than
the network size, and b) by class B attackers who advertise
degrees lower than the network size but inconsistently high.
We generated two random models of the node degree d in order
to evaluate the impact of the initial topology on the clustering
performance. We used a) the uniform distribution (U) to
simulate sparse scenarios in which the nodes with sufficient
energy are weighted more (e.g., home ad hoc applications),
and b) the heavy tail (HT) Pareto distribution (P) to simulate
groupe-dense scenarios, e.g., military ad hoc applications in
which the nodes with higher connectivity are more important.
For the Pareto model we set the coefficients (a, b, c, d) of Eq.
(2) to (0.4, 0.2, 0.4, 0) so that the connectivity and security
are weighted more during the CH selection phase.
Fig. 2 shows the CH change rate with respect to the ad hoc
radio range (each point is the average of 50 runs). Low radio
range values correspond to a sparse network while high radio
ranges to a dense.
Fig. 2. The CH change rates per ad hoc radio range.
Fig. 2 shows that each algorithm is more stable in the P
than the U placement case. HD/P achieved the most stable
clustering followed by RHD/P (by 11.91 increase in the rate).
The CCA/P performance lies between RHD/P and WHD/P
(219.6 overall increase of the HD/P rate). The curves exhibit
fluctuations due to our setting of clustering with restricted
membership. Under the same conditions each point in Fig.
3 shows the average probability to select an attacker as CH
(including stdev which increases with the radio range). CCA/P
achieved the best performance, especially when the network
is highly connected (range between 200-250 meters). CCA/P
was by 58.04 more attack resistant than HD/P. Fig. 4 shows the
average number of created clusters. HD/P achieved the least
number of clusters followed by CCA/P, RHD/P and WHD/P.
IV. DISCUSSION
All four degree-based algorithms were found more stable
for placements with HT characteristics. The RHD achieved
encouraging results. The CCA achieved to identify the faulty
claims and hence can avoid the impact of CH compromisation
Fig. 3. The average probability of selecting an attacker as CH.
Fig. 4. The average number of created clusters.
(such as packet loss). However, CCA imposed re-clustering
overhead. We conclude that the applicability of a specific
cooperative mechanism depends on the ad hoc application, the
conditions, the resources, and the type and level of threats.
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